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Abstract
In this paper, we consider adversarial attacks against
a system of monocular depth estimation (MDE) based on
convolutional neural networks (CNNs). The motivation is
two-fold. One is to study the security of MDE systems,
which has not been actively considered in the community.
The other is to improve our understanding of the computa-
tional mechanism of CNNs performing MDE. Toward this
end, we apply the method recently proposed for visualiza-
tion of MDE to defending attacks. It trains another CNN to
predict a saliency map from an input image, such that the
CNN for MDE continues to accurately estimate the depth
map from the image with its non-salient part masked out.
We report the following findings. First, unsurprisingly, at-
tacks by IFGSM (or equivalently PGD) succeed in making
the CNNs yield inaccurate depth estimates. Second, the at-
tacks can be defended by masking out non-salient pixels, in-
dicating that the attacks function by perturbing mostly non-
salient pixels. However, the prediction of saliency maps is
itself vulnerable to the attacks, even though it is not the
direct target of the attacks. We show that the attacks can
be defended by using a saliency map predicted by a CNN
trained to be robust to the attacks. These results provide an
effective defense method as well as a clue to understanding
the computational mechanism of CNNs for MDE.
1. Introduction
Monocular depth estimation, i.e., estimating the depth
of a three-dimensional scene from its single image, has a
long history of research in the fields of computer vision and
visual psychophysics. The recent employment of convolu-
tional neural networks (CNNs) has gained significant im-
provement in the estimation accuracy [4, 15, 12, 13, 5]. In
this paper, we consider adversarial attacks to the CNNs per-
forming this task and particularly defense methods against
them.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 1. Vulnerability of CNNs to adversarial examples on the
monocular depth estimation task. (a) Input. (b) Estimated depth
from (a). (c) Adversarial input created by IFGSM with  = 0.1
and 10 iterations; see Eq.(1) for details. (d) Estimate from (c).
The motivation of this study is two-fold. First, we study
the security of CNNs designed and trained for this task,
which are beginning to be deployed in real-world applica-
tions. Unsurprisingly, they are vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks, as shown in Fig. 1, although this has not been re-
ported in the literature to the authors’ knowledge.
Second, we attempt to understand, through analyses of
adversarial examples, in what computational mechanism
these CNNs infer depth from a single image. Recently, a
few studies have been published on this question, which in-
dicates that these CNNs utilize similar cues to those that are
believed to be used by the human vision [3, 10]. However,
we are still on the way to a full understanding of the mech-
anism. If there are adversarial examples that lead the CNNs
to malfunction, they should invalidate (some of) the cues
that the CNNs utilize. By analyzing these, we wish to gain
a deeper understanding of the inference mechanism.
Motivated by these two goals, we consider a defense
method against adversarial attacks that is based on the re-
cent study of Hu et al. [10] on the visualization of CNNs
for the monocular depth estimation task. They propose a
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Figure 2. Illustration of the proposed approach. Upper row: An ad-
versarial image forces a depth estimatorN yield erroneous output.
Lower row: The same adversarial image is detoxified by masking
it with a saliency map, which is estimated by a robust estimator
Gadv.
method for obtaining a saliency map, i.e., a set of a small
number of pixels from which a CNN can estimate depth
accurately. They show that such a saliency map can be pre-
dicted from the input image by another CNN trained for the
purpose. They then show that CNNs can estimate a depth
map fairly accurately from only a sparse subset of image
pixels specified by the predicted saliency map.
We utilize their framework for visualization to construct
a defense method, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Given an adver-
sarial input that will force the CNNN to yield an erroneous
depth map, a saliency map is first predicted by an auxiliary
CNN G, which is multiplied with the (adversarial) input in
a pixel-wise fashion; the resulting image is then fed to N ,
thereby aiming at obtaining an accurate depth map.
This idea is based on the following considerations. Ob-
serving the saliency maps predicted by the method of Hu
et al. [10], we can say that the CNNs use the portions of
images that are similar to those used by the human vision.
Thus, it is natural to hypothesize that the CNNs use simi-
lar cues and perform similar computations based on them
to the human vision. If so, why do the adversarial attacks
still succeed? (Why is it possible to affect CNNs by adding
slight perturbation to inputs that do not affect the human
vision?) To reconcile these two, considering that the CNN
receives all the pixels at their input, we conjecture that the
attacks are made possible not by perturbing salient pixels
containing important depth cues but by mostly perturbing
non-salient pixels.
A recent study has made an intriguing argument about
adversarial attacks on classification tasks [11]. There are
a number of features in images that could be effective for
classification within a given dataset. Dividing them into ro-
bust and non-robust features, the authors argue that the hu-
man vision uses only the former, whereas CNNs may use
them both, and that adversarial attacks affect only the non-
robust features, explaining why the attacks succeed without
affecting recognition by the human vision. Our approach
may be restated from their perspective that we define ro-
bust and non-robust ‘features’ for monocular depth estima-
tion by spatially dividing an input image based on the pixel
saliency.
In the rest of the paper, we will show the followings:
• Adversarial attacks by IFGSM for a depth estimation
CNN can be defended by masking out non-salient pix-
els in the inputs; see Fig. 3(e). This indicates that the
attack functions mostly by perturbing non-salient pix-
els.
• Attacks tailored for a depth prediction CNN also lead
the auxiliary CNN (for saliency map prediction) to
malfunction; see Fig. 3(d). Thus, the attacks cannot be
defended using the saliency maps predicted by them.
• The attacks can be defended by immunizing the auxil-
iary CNN against the attacks, which is made possible
by employing adversarial training for it; it is not neces-
sary to make any change on the depth CNN. This will
be a valid defense method; see Fig. 3(f).
2. Backgrounds
2.1. Adversarial Attack and Defense
In this paper, we mainly consider adversarial attacks by
IFGSM [14], the iterative version of the fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) [6], although there are a number of attack
methods; we refer the reader to a survey [1]. This is be-
cause IFGSM, which is also known as projected gradient
descent (PGD), is considered to be the strongest attack uti-
lizing the local first order information about the network
[19], and thus is primarily considered in the previous stud-
ies on defense methods.
IFGSM is briefly summarized as follows. Suppose a net-
work that has been trained for predicting y from an input x
by minimizing a loss `(x, y). Assuming we have access to
the gradient of the loss, IFGSM iteratively updates inputs
starting from a given input x(→ x∗0) according to
x∗t+1 = Clip,x {x∗t + α · sign(O`(xt∗, y))} . (1)
where  denotes l∞ bound of adversarial perturbation and
α is the step size. As shown in Fig. 1, this method is ef-
fective for monocular depth estimation. For the purpose of
clarification, we will use the following notation to indicate
that an adversarial input x∗ is generated from a clean input
x targeting at a network N :
x∗ = Adv(x;N), (2)
as shown in Fig. 3(a).
There are many other studies on defense methods. They
are roughly categorized into two classes. The first is to im-
prove the robustness of the target network against adver-
sarial images in some ways. The method of adversarial
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Figure 3. Configurations of depth estimation network N and saliency estimation network G considered in this paper. (a) N(x∗): N is
vulnerable to an adversarial input x∗. (b) N(x): N yields an accurate estimate from a clean image x. (c) Nadv(x∗): An estimator Nadv
robust to x∗. (d) N(x∗ ⊗ G(x∗)): N combined with G remains to be vulnerable. (e) N(x∗ ⊗ G(x)): An accurate estimate is obtained
when the clean image is input to G. (f) N(x∗ ⊗ Gadv(x∗)): A robust estimator Gadv trained by using adversarial inputs can be used to
defend the attack. All the adversarial images (with *) are identical; it is tailored for N in setting (a).
training [28, 22] creates adversarial images and uses them
for training along with normal images. There are a number
of methods that incorporate some regularizers to training,
such as the employment of network distillation [8], in which
the prediction of another network is used as a soft label,
the deep contrastive network, which employs a layer-wise
contrastive penalty [7], and non-standard training schemes,
such as saturating networks [23], parseval networks [2] and
adversarial-trained bayesian neural networks [17].
The other class of methods aim to remove perturbations
from adversarial images before they are fed into the target
network. It is proposed to detect adversarial images and
then use an auto-encoder to project them onto a learned
manifold of clean images [21]. A similar method is em-
ployed in Defense-GAN [24]. It is also proposed to remove
the perturbation from adversarial images by learning a de-
noiser network [16]. The proposed method differs from any
of the existing methods. It may be considered to lie in an
intersection of the above two classes.
2.2. Visualizing CNNs on Depth Estimation
It is a popular approach to visualize a saliency map, aim-
ing at understanding inference conducted by a CNN for an
input [26, 20, 27]. In the study of Hu et al. [10], this is
attempted for the monocular depth estimation task. Their
method finds a set of a small number of pixels from which a
CNN can estimate depth accurately. Specifically, they con-
sider a mask m, or equivalently a saliency map, which is
used to mask out the irrelevant pixels from x by element-
wise multiplication x⊗m. Then, the goal is to find m such
that the original inference will be maintained as much as
possible, that is,N(x) ∼ N(x⊗m), and alsom is as sparse
as possible, which reduces to the following optimization:
min
m
`dif(N(x), N(x⊗m)) + λ 1
n
‖m‖1, (3)
where `dif is a difference measure; λ is a control parame-
ter for the sparseness of m; n is the number of pixels; and
‖m‖1 is the `1 norm (of a vectorized version) of m. To
avoid artifacts generated by direct optimization of (3), they
propose to incorporate an auxiliary network G and train it
to predict m from x according to
min
G
`dif(y,N(x⊗G(x))) + λ 1
n
‖G(x)‖1. (4)
They show through experiments that the CNN N continues
to yield accurate depth from only a small number of pixels
of x that are delineated by the saliency map predicted from
x by G.
3. Method
3.1. Saliency Map and Adversarial Perturbation
We conducted a preliminary experiment to understand
how the method of Sec. 2.2, which was originally devel-
oped for visualization, reacts to adversarial attacks. In the
experiment, we used the same network N and G as well as
the dataset as in Sec. 4.2. The results are shown in Table 1.
Here, adversarial inputs x∗’s are generated targeting at N ,
i.e., x∗ = Adv(x,N). The fist row, ‘N(x∗)’, shows that N
is indeed vulnerable to this attack; error (RMSE) increases
from 0.555 for  = 0 (no attack) to 1.055 and 1.139 for
 = 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
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Table 1. Results of FGSM attack on several configurations of the
depth estimation network N of [10]. The numbers are RMSE val-
ues over the test set of NYU-v2; x∗ indicates the adversarial input
given by x∗ = Adv(x;N); G is the saliency estimation network.
N and G are trained on clean images.  = 0 means no attack.
 = 0  = 0.05  = 0.1
N(x∗) 0.555 1.055 1.139
N(x∗⊗G(x∗)) 0.683 0.813 0.943
N(x∗ ⊗G(x)) 0.683 0.696 0.712
The second row, ‘N(x∗ ⊗ G(x∗))’, shows the cases
where the perturbed x∗ is masked using the saliency map
(predicted by G from the same input x∗) and inputted to
N . The results indicate that this configuration is similarly
affected by the attack, although its effect is somewhat miti-
gated by the use of the mask. Note that the accuracy of this
configurationN(x∗⊗G(x∗)) is already a bit lower for clean
images than N(x∗), i.e., 0.683 vs 0.555. What comes as a
surprise is that as shown in the third row, ‘N(x∗ ⊗G(x))’,
when the mask G(x) computed from a clean x is applied to
x∗, this immunizes the whole system to the attack. The in-
crease of error is small, i.e., from 0.683 to 0.696 and 0.712
for  = 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
These indicate that
• FGSM generates an adversarial input x∗ =
Adv(x,N) by perturbing mainly the non-salient pix-
els of x.
• The adversarial inputs generated targeting at N force
the network G to yield an inaccurate saliency map.
Therefore, if we can make G predict an accurate saliency
map from x∗, or equivalently, G(x∗) ∼ G(x), then we will
be able to defend the attacks.
It should be noted here that if the attacker knows the con-
figuration C(x) ≡ N(x ⊗ G(x)) and can generate x∗∗ =
Adv(x,C), this defense strategy may not work. In fact, our
experiments showed that the error for N(x∗∗ ⊗ G(x∗∗) is
1.052 and 1.108 for  = 0.05 and 0.1, respectively. Thus,
in what follows, we will consider the scenario where the
attacker assumes that N alone is used to predict depth.
3.2. Saliency Prediction Robust to Attacks
Thus, we wish to obtain the saliency prediction network
G that is robust to attacks. Then, our objective is two-fold.
One is that, given an input image of a scene, we wish to
identify as few pixels in the image as possible from which
the depth can be predicted as accurately as possible. This
leads to prediction of saliency map with a sparseness con-
straint, which is proposed in [10]. The other is that we
want to make this prediction robust to possible adversarial
attacks.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for training the saliency prediction
network G. The batch size is set to 1 for simplicity.
Input: N : a target, fully-trained network for depth estima-
tion; χ: a training set, i.e., pairs of an RGB image of a
scene and its depth map; : `∞ bound for IFGSM; K:
training epochs; and J : iterations per epoch.
Output: Gadv: a network for predicting a saliency map.
1: for k = 1 to K do
2: for j = 1 to J do
3: Select an RGBD pair {x, y¯} from χ
4: p = Uniform(0, 1)
5: if p > 0.5 then
6:  = Uniform(0.01, 0.3)
7: T = bUniform(1, 10)c
8: x∗0 = x
9: t = 0
10: for t = 1 to T do
11: x∗t+1 = IFGSM(x
∗
t , )
12: end for
13: x′ = x∗t
14: else
15: x′ = x
16: end if
17: L = `dif(y¯, N(x
′ ⊗G(x′))) + λ 1n‖G(x′)‖1
18: Backpropagate L
19: Update G
20: end for
21: end for
22: Gadv ← G
To met the first requirement, we follow the method of
[10] for training with a slight modification. It is the use of
ground truth depth y¯ as the desired target; in the original
method, the output y = N(x) obtained from mask-free in-
put is used as the target. We found in our experiments that
this yields better performance.
To satisfy the second requirement, we employ adversar-
ial training; that is, we use not only clean images x’s but
adversarially perturbed images x∗’s for training G. Note
that we do not touch the depth prediction network N in this
process.
Then, the training of G is expressed as the following op-
timization:
Gadv = argmin
G
`dif(y¯, N(x
′ ⊗G(x′))) + λ 1
n
‖G(x′)‖1,
(5)
where x′ is either an input clean image or an adversarial
image generated from a clean image.
The details of the procedure of training are given in Al-
gorithm 1. The adversarial examples x∗’s are generated by
IFGSM so that prediction error measured by `1 norm of
depth map will be maximized. The `∞ bound  and the
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number of iterations for IFGSM are randomly chosen from
uniform distributions in the range of (0.01, 0.3) and (1, 10),
respectively. Following most of the previous studies, the
step size α in Eq.(1) is set to 1. Thus, if the number of it-
erations is one, it reduces to FGSM. For `dif , we use the
loss function proposed in [9], which calculates the errors of
depth, gradient, and normals, as:
`dif = ldepth + lgrad + lnormal, (6)
where ldepth = 1n
∑n
i=1 F (ei) with F (ei) = ln(ei + 0.5),
ei = ‖y¯i − yi‖1, and y¯i and yi are true and estimated
depths; lgrad = 1n
∑n
i=1(F (∇x(ei)) + F (∇y(ei))); and
lnormal =
1
n
∑n
i=1 (1− cos θi) where θi is the angle be-
tween the surface normals computed from the true and esti-
mated depth map.
3.3. Defense by Masking Least Salient Pixels
We expect that the above procedure will yield Gadv that
can robustly predict a correct saliency map even from an
adversarial input x∗ = Adv(x,N), i.e., Gadv(x∗) ∼ G(x).
Recall here that we do not touch the depth estimation net-
work N during the training of Gadv. This is different from
a standard defense strategy that tries to make N itself ro-
bust to attacks, such as employment of adversarial training
on N . This could be an advantage in some practical ap-
plications. In this sense, our method is more similar to the
‘denoising’ approach to cope with attacks, such as projec-
tion of adversarial images to the manifold of clean images
[16]. However, it also differs from them in that it identifies
and masks irrelevant pixels for depth estimation, thereby
minimizing the impact of attacks.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental Setting
Dataset We use the NYU-v2 dataset [25] for all the ex-
periments. The dataset consists of a variety of indoor scenes
and is used in most of the previous studies. We use the stan-
dard procedure for preprocessing [4, 12, 18]. To be specific,
the official splits of 464 scenes are used, i.e., 249 scenes for
training and 215 scenes for testing. The official toolbox is
used to extract RGB images and depth maps from the raw
data, and then fill in missing pixels in the depth maps to
generate ground truths. This results in approximately 50K
unique pairs of an image and a depth map of 640×480 pixel
size. The images are then resized down to 320×240 pixels
using bilinear interpolation, and then crop their central parts
of 304×228 pixels, which are used as inputs to networks.
The depth maps are resized to 152 × 114 pixels. For test-
ing, following the previous studies, we use the same small
subset of 654 samples.
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Figure 4. The RMSE of the depth maps estimated by N(x∗) (‘w/o
defense’) and N(x∗ ⊗ Gadv(x∗)) (‘w/defense’) from adversarial
inputs generated by FGSM with different perturbation strength .
Networks For N , we use the network built on ResNet-
50 in [9]. It is trained on the data mentioned above. For
Gadv (and G), we employ the same encoder-decoder net-
work as [10]. It employs a dilated residual network (DRN)
proposed in [29] for the encoder part and three stacks of the
up-projection blocks proposed in [12] for the decoder part.
It outputs a saliency map of the same size as the input im-
age. We trainGadv according to Algorithm 1 for 60 epochs.
The parameter λ controlling the sparseness of the saliency
map is set to 1. We use the Adam optimizer with a learning
rate of 0.0001, (β1, β2) = (0.9, 0.999) and weight decay of
0.0001.
4.2. Defense to White-box Attacks
FGSM attacks with different ’s We first evaluated the
performance of the plain network N(x∗) (Fig. 3(a)) and the
proposed method N(x∗ ⊗Gadv(x∗)) (Fig. 3(f)) for FGSM
attacks with different magnitude  of perturbation. Each
adversarial example x∗ is generated by FGSM with an 
to maximize the `1 norm of the difference between the es-
timate N(x∗) and its ground truth. We generated one x∗
for each of the NYU-v2 test images and calculate the av-
erage of depth estimation errors (measured by RMSE) by
the two models. The results are shown in Fig. 4. It is first
confirmed from the plot that the attack is indeed effective
for the plain network N(x∗) without any defense; the error
increases rapidly even with small . It is also seen that our
methodN(x∗⊗Gadv(x∗)) works fairly well; the error only
increases slowly with increasing .
IFGSM attacks We also evaluated their performance for
IFGSM attacks. Figure 5 shows the averaged RMSE over
all the inputs x∗’s generated by IFGSM with various itera-
tions and a constant  = 0.1. It is seen that the plain net-
work N(x∗) suffers more from x∗ generated with larger it-
erations, whereas the proposed method N(x∗ ⊗Gadv(x∗))
is able to stably defend the attack. Although it is not shown
here, it continues to perform well for larger iterations (>
10).
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Table 2. Quantitative comparisons of four depth estimation methods. N(x) is the plain network trained only on clean images. Nadv(x) is
the same net but trained also on adversarial inputs. G(x) is the saliency predictor trained only on clean images. Gadv(x) is the same net
but trained on adversarial inputs by Algorithm 1. The adversarial inputs x∗’s are generated targeting N(x) by IFGSM with 10 iterations.
Attack Prediction Method RMSE ↓ REL↓ log 10 ↓ δ < 1.25 ↑ δ < 1.252 ↑ δ < 1.253 ↑
No attack (clean) N(x) 0.555 0.126 0.054 0.843 0.968 0.991
Nadv(x) 0.682 0.167 0.071 0.757 0.935 0.979
N(x⊗G(x)) 0.683 0.154 0.068 0.773 0.939 0.982
N(x⊗Gadv(x)) 0.615 0.148 0.063 0.792 0.952 0.987
IFGSM ( = 0.05) N(x∗) 1.465 0.419 0.200 0.249 0.568 0.774
Nadv(x
∗) 0.666 0.160 0.067 0.774 0.943 0.982
N(x∗ ⊗G(x)) 0.692 0.156 0.069 0.768 0.937 0.981
N(x∗ ⊗Gadv(x∗)) 0.644 0.158 0.067 0.771 0.945 0.984
IFGSM ( = 0.1) N(x∗) 1.792 0.373 0.273 0.161 0.373 0.571
Nadv(x
∗) 0.677 0.159 0.068 0.769 0.942 0.981
N(x∗ ⊗G(x)) 0.706 0.158 0.070 0.763 0.934 0.980
N(x∗ ⊗Gadv(x∗)) 0.655 0.160 0.067 0.770 0.942 0.983
IFGSM ( = 0.15) N(x∗) 1.988 0.516 0.325 0.109 0.263 0.442
Nadv(x
∗) 0.724 0.167 0.073 0.741 0.931 0.976
N(x∗ ⊗G(x)) 0.720 0.159 0.071 0.759 0.931 0.978
N(x∗ ⊗Gadv(x∗)) 0.677 0.162 0.068 0.767 0.939 0.981
IFGSM ( = 0.2) N(x∗) 2.107 0.541 0.360 0.075 0.201 0.370
Nadv(x
∗) 0.798 0.180 0.081 0.701 0.911 0.970
N(x∗ ⊗G(x)) 0.743 0.161 0.074 0.751 0.927 0.977
N(x∗ ⊗Gadv(x∗)) 0.703 0.165 0.071 0.754 0.933 0.979
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Figure 5. The RMSE of the depth maps estimated by the same
two methods from adversarial inputs generated by IFGSM with
different iterations.
We then compared the above two methods and addition-
ally two other methods on IFGSM attacks with different
perturbation magnitude. One additional method is the net-
work N directly trained by adversarial training [14], de-
noted by Nadv (Fig. 3(c)). Specifically, similarly to the
training of Gadv, it is trained using both clean and adver-
sarial images, but its encoder part (Resnet-50) starts with a
pretrained model on ImageNet, following [9]. The other is
N(x∗ ⊗ G(x)) (Fig. 3(e)), i.e., inputting to the plain net-
work N the multiplication of x∗ and a saliency map pre-
dicted from a clean input x by G. Here, G is trained using
only clean images, for which the sparseness parameter is set
to λ = 5 as recommended in [10].
Table 2 shows the evaluation of the four methods us-
ing multiple accuracy metrics. Adversarial examples were
generated by IFGSM with four different ’s and 10 itera-
tions. It is observed from the table that the three methods
are all effective in defending the attacks for all the ’s. It
is also seen that the proposed method, N(x∗ ⊗ Gadv(x∗)),
achieves the best performance among the three; it is bet-
ter than Nadv(x∗) by a good margin and is equivalent or
slightly better thanN(x∗⊗G(x)). Note thatN(x∗⊗G(x))
cannot be used in practice, as it needs a clean x. It is an
ideal implementation of our conjecture that an adversarial
input x∗ can be detoxified by masking x∗ with an accurate
saliency map. The results show that this ideal implemen-
tation works well as a defense method, which well vali-
dates our conjecture. The results also show that the pro-
posed method achieves comparable to or even better per-
formance than it, which confirms that Gadv(x∗) can yield
accurate saliency map even from x∗ and help defense to at-
tacks. Figure 6 shows the depth maps predicted by these
methods from adversarial inputs for different scenes.
Effects of Losses Used for Adversarial Example Gener-
ation Adversarial inputs are generated so that they will
maximize errors. There are a number of choices in the
measure of the errors, or losses, such as `1 norm (used in
the experiments so far), `2, etc. To investigate if the de-
fending performance will be affected by the choice of this
loss, we conducted an experiment. Specifically, we use the
same Gadv trained assuming `1 and test its performance
against adversarial images generated using `2, REL, log 10
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N(x∗⊗Gadv(x∗))
Figure 6. Visual comparisons of depth maps estimated from adversarial inputs x∗’s generated by IFGSM with  = 0.1 and 10 iterations;
x’s are clean inputs.
Table 3. Effects of the use of different losses for creation of adver-
sarial inputs. Gadv is a single model trained assuming `1. RMSE
of depth estimation.
Loss N(x∗) N(x∗ ⊗Gadv(x∗))
`1 1.778 0.664
`2 1.842 0.666
REL 1.694 0.664
log 10 1.783 0.659
`dif 1.718 0.662
and `dif , respectively. Here we use IFGSM with 5 itera-
tions and  = 0.1. Table 3 shows the results, indicating
that all the losses are effective in making the plain net-
work N(x∗) yield erroneous depths, whereas the proposed
methodN(x∗⊗Gadv(x∗)) consistently performs well inde-
pendently of the loss used for the adversarial example gen-
eration.
Effects of Number of Layers of Gadv We also investi-
gate how the number of layers of the saliency estimation
networkGadv affects defense performance. We testedGadv
having different numbers of layers for its encoder part: 22,
Table 4. Effects of the number of layers of Gadv on adversarial
defense.
Layers of the encoder in Gadv RMSE
W/o Gadv (plain N ) 1.778
22 0.664
38 0.659
54 0.655
38, and 54 layers. Adversarial examples are generated by
IFGSM with 5 iterations and  = 0.1. Table 4 shows the
results. It indicates that the more layersGadv has, the better
performance we have, although the improvements are fairly
small.
4.3. Qualitative Analysis
Figure 7 shows adversarial examples and the saliency
maps from them predicted by G and Gadv, along with their
differences showing the effects of attacks. Here, the same
images as Fig. 6 are chosen, for which adversarial inputs
are generated by IFGSM with  = 0.1 and 10 iterations. It
is first observed that the perturbations (Fig. 7(b)) caused by
the attack do not appear to be correlated with the saliency
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(a) x∗ (b) x− x∗ (c) G(x) (d) G(x∗) (e) Gadv(x) (f) Gadv(x∗) (g)
|G(x)−G(x∗)|
(h) |Gadv(x)−
Gadv(x
∗)|
Figure 7. Visualization of clean and adversarial inputs and the saliency maps predicted from them. An identical color map created on a
certain range is used for (c)-(f) and for (g) and (h), respectively.
map and rather appear to be random. Although this agrees
with the previously reported observation (mostly on classi-
fication tasks), it may not appear to be consistent with our
hypothesis that adversarial examples function by perturbing
non-salient pixels. This may be because that in the attack
by FGSM/IFGSM (Eq.(1)), a constraint is imposed only on
the magnitude of perturbation but not on the number of per-
turbed pixels. On the other hand, it can be confirmed from
|G(x) − G(x∗)| (Fig. 7(g)) that the attacks affect G in its
prediction, although x∗ is created for N not for G. It is also
seen from |Gadv(x) − Gadv(x∗)| (Fig. 7(h)) that Gadv is
indeed robust to the attacks.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed how CNNs for monoc-
ular depth estimation react against adversarial attacks. For
the IFGSM attack, we have validated the three items listed
at the last of Sec. 1 through a number of experiments. They
can be summarized as follows. IFGSM attacks can be
defended by masking out non-salient pixels in the inputs.
The non-salient pixels can be identified either by predicting
saliency maps from clean images or by predicting saliency
maps from adversarial inputs using an estimator trained to
be robust to the attacks. This study has two contributions.
One is the proposal of an effective defense method against
the IFGSM attack, provided that the attacker has the knowl-
edge of the depth estimation CNN including its weights but
does not recognize that we are using this defense method.
The other is that our results indicate that the attacks func-
tion mostly by perturbing non-salient pixels, which will be
a clue to understand how the CNNs yield an accurate depth
map from a single (clean) image.
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